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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






GAZMEND MANI;  
ANILA SELHANI MANI, 
 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                            Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A077-654-655 & A077-654-654) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald V. Ferlise 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 12, 2014 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 









 Lead petitioner Gazmend Mani and his wife, Anila Selhani Mani,1 petition for 
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying their motion to 
reopen their consolidated removal proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition. 
I. 
 In 2000, Petitioners, who are natives and citizens of Albania, arrived in the United 
States and sought admission.  Shortly after their arrival, they were placed in removal 
proceedings and charged with being inadmissible for (1) not possessing valid entry 
documents at the time they sought admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and  
(2) willfully misrepresenting their identity when they sought admission, see 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  Petitioners conceded the first charge and the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) sustained the latter charge.  As relief from removal, Petitioners sought asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 
At the merits hearing before the IJ, Mani testified that he had owned a clothing shop in 
Albania.  In December 1999, someone put a letter under Mani’s door demanding money.  
A few days later, men wearing black masks and carrying assault rifles came to his shop 
and collected the money.  This series of events happened again in January 2000.  In 
February 2000, Mani received a third letter, this one demanding even more money.  Mani 
did not have the money needed to meet this third demand, so he decided to close the 
shop.  He and Selhani left Albania shortly thereafter. 
                                              
1 For clarity’s sake, we will refer to Gazmend Mani as “Mani” and Anila Selhani Mani as 
3 
 Mani further testified that, although he had never been a member of Albania’s 
Democratic Party, he had participated in some of the party’s demonstrations in the 1990s.  
Mani believed that the masked men who had accosted him were associated with 
Albania’s Socialist Party.  Mani also stated that, after he left Albania, he heard from his 
cousin that the masked men had shot at Mani’s house and killed his dog. 
 After hearing Mani’s testimony, the IJ denied Petitioners’ application for relief 
and ordered their removal from the United States.  The IJ concluded that, although Mani 
had been the victim of extortion, Petitioners had failed to produce any evidence 
connecting his mistreatment to his support of the Democratic Party or another ground 
protected under the Immigration and Nationality Act.  The IJ also concluded that 
Petitioners had failed to show that they would likely be tortured if they were to return to 
Albania.  Petitioners appealed from the IJ’s decision, but the BIA affirmed without an 
opinion.  Petitioners did not petition for review of that affirmance. 
 More than ten years later, in March 2013, Petitioners moved to reopen their 
removal proceedings, claiming that they had new, material evidence and that country 
conditions in Albania had changed.  The motion, which relied largely on declarations 
from Professor Julie Mertus from American University and Professor Brian Glyn 
Williams from the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, revolved around Mani’s 
support of the Democratic Party, his status as a former business owner, and his fear that 
his two United States citizen daughters (both of whom were born after Petitioners left 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Selhani.”  We will collectively refer to them as “Petitioners.” 
4 
Albania) would be kidnapped and forced into prostitution if the family returned to 
Albania.  The Government opposed the motion. 
 On June 20, 2013, the BIA denied reopening, stating that Petitioners “have not set 
forth materially changed country conditions or circumstances in Albania, or a prima facie 
persecution claim based on a protected ground.”  (J.A. at 4.)  The BIA emphasized that 
Petitioners “have offered no evidence that shop keepers, or former shop keepers, are 
persecuted in Albania because they own or have owned shops, or that individuals who 
have returned to Albania after a long absence are targeted for persecution on account of a 
protected ground.”  (Id.)  The BIA also stressed that the various articles submitted by 
Petitioners “do not show that the perpetrators [who kidnap and traffic Albanian girls] are 
affiliated with any political party, or that they employ kidnapping and trafficking to 
punish individuals for their political opinions or to punish them on account of any other 
basis for asylum and withholding of removal.”  (Id.)  Additionally, the BIA noted that 
Petitioners’ daughters were United States citizens and, therefore, were not required to go 
with Petitioners to Albania.  Petitioners now seek review of the BIA’s denial of 
reopening.2 
                                              
2 At the end of its decision, the BIA stated that Petitioners’ case did not warrant 
reopening under the BIA’s sua sponte authority.  “[W]e generally lack jurisdiction to 
review the BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte,” Pllumi v. 
Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011), and, in any event, Petitioners do not 
challenge that aspect of the BIA’s decision.  We also note that, to the extent that 
Petitioners’ motion to reopen sought to pursue CAT relief, they have waived any 
challenge relating to that aspect of their case.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-
CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived 





 We have jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  “We 
review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and review its 
underlying factual findings related to the motion for substantial evidence.”  Shardar v. 
Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  A denial of 
reopening constitutes an abuse of discretion only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  We review constitutional claims de novo.  
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 An alien generally must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of the 
final order of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  There is no such time limit, 
however, if the alien’s motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the 
country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence 
is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the 
previous proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  A change in country conditions is 
“material” only if it would change the outcome of the alien’s application for relief.  See 
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012).  The BIA may deny a motion to 
reopen if it concludes that “(1) the alien has not established a prima facie case for the 
                                                                                                                                                  
reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
6 
relief sought; (2) the alien has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence; 
or (3) in the case of discretionary relief (such as asylum), the alien would not be entitled 
to relief even if the motion was granted.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). 
 Having carefully considered the record,3 and for the reasons provided by the BIA, 
we cannot conclude that the agency abused its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion 
to reopen.  Although Petitioners claim that the BIA violated their due process rights by 
failing to consider all of their evidence, we see no such violation.  The BIA’s decision 
specifically discussed the declarations from the two professors and the collection of 
background evidence submitted by Petitioners, and we are convinced that the BIA gave 
due consideration to this evidence.  We are also unpersuaded by Petitioners’ claim that 
the BIA’s decision conflicts with its prior rulings in three unpublished cases in which 
Petitioners’ counsel participated.  Even setting aside the fact that those rulings are not 
binding precedent, Petitioners have not established that the aliens in those cases were 
similarly situated to Petitioners.4     
                                              
3 To the extent that Petitioners attempt to rely on events that took place in Albania after 
the BIA denied reopening, they may not do so.  Our review of the BIA’s decision is 
confined to the administrative record.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
4 In the first of the three cases highlighted by Petitioners, the BIA granted reopening 
based on its sua sponte authority (an issue that is not before us here), and did so in part 
based on the IJ’s prior finding of past persecution (of course, no such finding was made 
in Petitioners’ case).  (See Pet’rs’ Addendum at A1.)  In the second case, the BIA again 
granted sua sponte reopening, and based that ruling on, inter alia, the IJ’s prior finding of 
past persecution and the fact that the Government did not oppose reopening (as noted 
above, the Government did oppose reopening in Petitioners’ case).  (See id. at A2.)  In 
the third case, which did not even identify the home country of the aliens involved, the 
7 
 In light of the above, we will deny the petition for review.  Petitioners’ request for 
oral argument is denied. 
                                                                                                                                                  
BIA granted reopening based on “the particular circumstances present in this case” and 
the Government’s non-opposition to reopening.  (Id. at A3.)  
